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Vaikka muut Euroopan maat ovat Venäjän tärkeimpiä kauppakumppaneita ja  myös inves-
toivat eniten Venäjälle, on euron osuus Venäjän rahoitusmarkkinoilla hyvin pieni. Yhdys-
valtain dollaria käytetään paljon yleisemmin erilaisiin rahoitustransaktioihin. Tässä työssä 
tutkitaan tätä ilmiötä erottamalla Venäjän substituutiovaluuttojen kaksi erilaista käyt-
tötarkoitusta: rahan on sekä vaihdon että arvon säilyttämisen väline. Työssä testatataan 
kolmen eri tekijän (inertia, kauppasuhteiden kehitys ja valuuttakurssien muutokset) vaiku-
tusta euron suhteelliseen kysyntään Venäjällä vuosina 1994–2004. Eri valuuttojen käyttö 
voi teoreettisesti johtua taloudellisten agenttien syvään juurtuneista sovinnaistavoista  
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The analysis of external economic relations of Russia reveals a paradox: while Europe is 
the main trade and direct investment partner of Russia, this is far from being the case con-
cerning its currency’s role in Russia's financial activities. The dollar is much preferred by 
economic agents for financial operations. This paper proposes a disaggregated approach to 
this issue by separating the ‘means of exchange’ and ‘store of value’ components of the 
use of substitution currencies. The influence of three main factors (inertial component, real 
trade relations and exchange rate fluctuations) on the relative demand for the euro by Rus-
sian economic agents is tested for the period 1999-2004. Finally we suggest a theoretical 
interpretation of the results based on the conventions theory approach.  
 
Keywords: dollarisation, euroisation, transition, Russia, currency substitution, asset substi-
tution, network externalities, hysteresis, conventions 
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1 Introduction 
 
Dollarisation is a largely observed phenomenon in emerging economies. Existing studies 
demonstrate the high level of dollarisation of Latin American economies (Feige et al 
[2002]) but also of economies in transition (Sahay and Vegh [1995]). These studies focus 
on dollarisation in the generic sense, including the use of all foreign currencies inside a 
given country. The impact of dollarisation on policy issues (Baliño, Bennett, Borensztein 
[1999], Broda, Levy-Yeyati [2002]), banks balance sheets (Ize, Levy-Yeyati [1998], 
Broda, Levy-Yeyati [2003]), financial crises (Powell and Sturzenegger [2000]) and ex-
change rate regimes (Arteta [2002]) have been widely documented. Studies on the origins 
of dollarisation mention a large group of factors including inflation and exchange rate 
volatility, weakness of local financial markets (Pionktovsky [2003]) coupled with the exis-
tence of the "shadow" (unofficial) sector of the economy (the influence of this factor being 
bi-directional, Feidge et al [2002]). Other researches (Caballero et al [2004], De Nicolo
 et 
al [2003]) mention more long term oriented issues, like confidence (in money, monetary 
policy and the banking system), but also the important persistence effects often qualifying 
as hysteresis (Shinkevich and Oomes [2002]). Our research focusing on the Russian case 
suggests the existence of links between dollarisation and the overall uncertainty related to 
institutional weakness (Khartchenko-Dorbec [2004]). 
The discussion on the relevance of de-dollarisation policies versus complete (offi-
cial) dollarisation is still animated (Goldfajn and Olivares [2000]). Advocates of complete 
dollarisation or euroisation suggest that adopting a strong foreign currency enables coun-
tries to eliminate the temptation of inflationary finance and thereby avoid currency and 
balance of payment crises, reduce the level and volatility of interest rates, and ultimately to 
stimulate growth. IMF [1999] suggests that reliance on a foreign currency could facilitate 
the development of financial intermediation in a high inflation environment. It can also 
foster closer integration with international financial markets, increase competition and 
make available a more complete set of assets for domestic investors.  
Edwards and Igal Magendzo [2002], however, found a strong evidence for the 
negative impact of full dollarisation on economic growth (albeit it helps to significantly 
reduce inflation), thus the evidence on complete dollarisation's positive impact on eco-
nomic dynamics is still ambiguous.  Anna Dorbec  
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Advocates of de-dollarisation measures cite the loss of seigniorage and loss of an 
independent monetary policy for dollarized countries (Feige et al [2002]). When dollarisa-
tion or euroisation is widespread, the effective money supply is much larger than the do-
mestic money supply and is also less easily controlled by the monetary authority because 
of the public’s propensity to substitute foreign and domestic currency. Extensive currency 
substitution not only makes domestic monetary policy less effective, it also makes active 
exchange rate intervention more dangerous. Currency substitution also has fiscal conse-
quences that are particularly salient for transition countries. Foreign cash transactions re-
duce the costs of tax evasion and facilitate participation in the underground economy. By 
obscuring financial transactions, currency substitution reduces the cost of enterprise theft 
and facilitates corruption and rent seeking (Feige [1994]). This weakens the government’s 
ability to divert real resources from the private sector and deepens fiscal deficits. The wide 
use of the dollar as a saving instrument weakens the ability of the national banking system 
to reallocate liquidity inside the economy and thus reduces the supply of financing to do-
mestic producers (Khartchenko-Dorbec [2004]). 
In Russian economy, as in many transition economies, foreign currencies are used 
not only in international trade, but also as domestic money. According to the definition, 
unofficial euroisation and dollarisation results from individuals and firms voluntarily 
choosing to use foreign currency as either a means-of-exchange substitute (currency substi-
tution) or store-of- value substitute (asset substitution). In practice, asset substitution con-
cerns not only foreign currency denominated assets (deposits and securities) but also cash 
acquisitions realised by households.  
In this paper we focus on dollarisation/euroisation in a more narrow sense by trying 
to understand factors determining the choices of substitution currency by economic agents. 
The Russian case is particularly interesting from this point of view because of the existence 
of important dollar domination in a country that is geographically and economically close 
to the European Union. This situation exposes the Russian financial system to an additional 
exchange rate risk: while the main trade flows are with Europe (Europe’s top ranking holds 
even if we adjust for oil exports), the major part of assets is still denominated in US dol-
lars.  
The dominance of the dollar in international financial markets and its importance as 
an international reserve currency matters for the choice of currency of substitution. Ac-
cording to the analysis of the ECB [2005], the US dollar is used to denominate 43% of all BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/ 2005 
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debt securities issued on international financial markets (issued outside of borrower’s 
country of residence) while the share of the euro is about 31% (this share has continually 
increased during past 6 years). However, the study indicates the important ‘regional’ aspect 
of international use of the euro: the European currency is largely used in countries geo-
graphically close to the European Union. In this situation the dominance of the dollar for 
Russia and the CEI needs to be examined in more detail.  
The purpose of this paper is to define the factors influencing the choice of Russian eco-
nomic agents between the two main international reserve currencies: the euro and the 
dollar.  
This type of probing should help us to better understand the main issues in dollari-
sation and the motivations of different types of agents. Such research seeks evidence on the 
relative efficiency of different de-dollarisation policy measures.  
We analyse data from early 1999 to late 2004. In order to better understand the dif-
ferent aspects of use of the euro and of the dollar in the Russian economy we analyze sepa-
rately the different aspects of dollarisation by type of economic agent. Bordo and Choudri 
[1982] point out that focusing exclusively on the financial (or speculative) approach in the 
dollarisation issue omits the transaction demand for currency. The authors suggest (particu-
larly for analysis of dollarisation in low and moderate inflation countries, which is actually 
the Russian case) that in order to obtain a proper measure of the dynamics of currency sub-
stitution, explicit measures of the transaction demand are essential. Accepting this idea, we 
disaggregate dollarisation and euroisation indicators by separating flows of cash conver-
sion operations, mainly realized by households approximating a store-of-value role for the 
substitution currency, and currency exchange operations which concern banks and enter-
prises and better approximate the transaction demand for substitution currencies. This dis-
aggregated approach points out the existence of substantial heterogeneity of agents’ behav-
iour and confirms that a variety of policy approaches is needed to reduce dollar domination 
(and more generally to reduce dollarisation in the generic sense). Finally we suggest a 
theoretical interpretation of our results by using the approach of the theory of conventions.   
The paper is organised as follows. The first section contains a descriptive data 
analysis of different aspects of the choice of Russian economic agents as between the euro 
and the dollar. The second section gives a brief survey of existing theories in the field of 
Dollarisation, which could be applied to the problem of the choice of a substitution cur-Anna Dorbec  
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rency. The third section contains the econometric estimation results. Section 4 presents a 
theoretical interpretation of observed results, and the fifth section concludes. 
 
 
2  Empirical evidence 
 
We first examine Real aspects of economic relations with euro- and dollar- dominated 
countries. Secondly we analyse in more detail the financial aspects of this issue. 




























































































Europ25_in total trade Europ25_non-oil trade
Europ25_in foreign trade excluding CIS oil_in russian exports
 
Source: Eurostat, Central Bank of Russia, Russian Federal Service of State Statistics, High College of Eco-
nomics database 
As we can observe from Figure 1, 25 European Union countries account about 50-60 per 
cent of Russian foreign trade. The importance of trade with European countries for Russia 
is accentuated by the indicator of trade with non-CIS countries. Here European countries’ 
share is about 80 per cent in 2003 and 60 per cent at the end of 2004. It is interesting to no-
tice that if we exclude oil from exports (negotiated in dollars), Europe is still the main 
trade partner of Russian enterprises. The dominance of European countries cannot, there-
fore, be reduced to oil exports, and necessarily contains other euro-denominated compo-
nents.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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At the same time, the share of the USA in Russian foreign trade is still small (3.8 per cent 
for 2003 and 2004, 3.5 per cent for 2002).  
CIS countries are the second most attractive zone for Russia’s trade relations. Their 
share in Russian external turnover was 17 per cent in 2002, 17.5 per cent in 2003, and 18.3 
per cent in 2004. Such trade relations could be the basis for the development of an interna-
tional role for the rouble, but, given the influence of the dollar in the CIS zone and the 
weakness of the CIS as an institution, one can argue that trade with the CIS is mainly dol-
lar-based.  
If the dollar zone is defined in a broad sense, its share in Russian foreign trade ac-
counts for about half. In such a case, on the basis of international trade relations, one 
would expect considerable euro demand and supply in national currency markets and con-
sequently an important anchoring of monetary policy on the bi-currency basket. 
Foreign direct investment is another area of application for international currencies, 
in addition to trade: FDI flows can account for the development of close economic integra-
tion between countries, so a quick review of these statistics could be useful as an indicator 
of the existence of economic links. We should, however, notice that FDI does not represent 
the main international capital flows for Russia: according to official statistical data, it ac-
counts for only 19.2 per cent of foreign investment in Russia for the period January-
September 2004 (22.3 per cent for the same period of 2003). Official statistics suggest 
however that more than 49 per cent of total FDI accumulated in Russia came from one of 
the European countries (we excluded the 13 per cent for Cyprus, due to its particular off-
shore status and use largely by Russians in capital flight operations and undoubtedly in-
cluding the return of previously exported capital). USA takes 6
th place with 9 per cent of 
total accumulated investment. It can be seen that the share of euro area countries is much 
greater than that of other investors, even of Russians repatriating capital from offshore. 
This situation should also reinforce the euro's influence on the Russian economy, currency 
market, and expectations. 
However, even a rapid overview of macroeconomic statistics published by Russian 
government agencies (Federal Statistical Service, Central Bank of Russia) and analytical 
materials issued by the financial and economic press (Rosbusinessconsulting, Expert, 
Cbonds) makes it clear that the US dollar, while not a legal and institutionalised monetary 
unit, acts as the main unit of account for both private economic agents and the government. 
In this situation, the role of public institutions is controversial: on the one hand, it is more Anna Dorbec  
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useful for them to publish statistics in the most common unit while, on the other, this dollar 
bias in public administration tends to strengthen the dollar's role in the economy.  
The above-mentioned situation in Russian foreign trade and the inflow of FDI 
should have led to high volumes of euro sales on the national currency market. One would 
expect these operations to account for 35-50 per cent of all the currency purchases and 
sales in the Russian market.  
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Source: Central Bank of Russia 
However, as can be seen from Figure 2, the real situation is far from this hypothetical one; 
the dollar is obviously predominant in the Russian interbank currency market (as we ob-
serve from Figure 2, its share was never under 96 per cent during 1999-2004). These data 
are confirmed by the analysis of interbank conversion operations by currency (including 
operations realised outside currency exchanges): euro-to-dollar conversion operations ac-
count for about 80 per cent of total conversion operations realised in the euro in Russia 
during 2003-2004, the rouble-to-euro operations’ share is quite insignificant. Thus the euro 
is converted into dollars and not into roubles as one might expect. As far as the dollar is 
concerned, the major part of conversion operations concerns conversion into roubles (share 
between 63 and 78 per cent of total volume of exchange operations during 2003-2004) and 
into euros (16-25 per cent for the same period). So we can conclude that the dollar is a ve-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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hicle currency supporting all kinds of conversion operations. This information gives us ad-
ditional evidence concerning the dominance of the dollar in Russian financial activity, 
which confirms the data presented in Figure 2 on the share of operations in euro on the of-
ficial currency exchanges. 
Accordingly, currency demand factors clearly favour the dollar, despite the impor-
tance of Europe in Russian foreign trade. One can conclude that commercial contacts with 
Europe are denominated in dollars: in fact, according to a recent review of the international 
role of the euro by the ECB [2005], even for European countries (Belguim, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain) the euro is used as a settle-
ment/invoicing currency for only 54% of exports and 51% of imports. The observed data 
for Russia also reflect the evidence that euros and dollars are not used exclusively for in-
ternational trade. While transactions in dollars between residents are officially forbidden 
(and so are very difficult to estimate), the euros and dollars are widely used for asset nomi-
nation
1. The following data provides some evidence about euro and dollar shares as the 
currencies of asset nomination. If we break down the stock of debt financing nominated in 
foreign currencies between euro and dollar financing (data for the end of 2004) the ob-
tained evidence also confirms the dollar domination of financial sphere. 
Table 1.  Euro and dollar denominated assets in Russia (end of 2004) 








Federal government  1 250  4%  40 148  96%  41 694 
Subfederal government  774  91%  100  9%  1 058 
Eurobonds** private  1 430  7%  23 320  93%  25 089 
Bank forex denominated 
credit to non financial private 
sector 
nd nd nd nd  29  692 
* The average 2003-2004 euro-dollar exchange rate is applied in order to calculate totals and percentages in 
columns (2), (4) and (5).  
** The term Eurobonds is used here to define all foreign currency denominated bonds. 
 
Data presented on the above table leave no doubt about the dominance of the US dollar in 
financial operations, despite important trade relations with Europe.  
 
 Anna Dorbec  
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€ in total volume of cash exchange operations of banks
€ exchange operations as % of total number of banks' exchange operations
 
Operations in euro before 2002 are approximated by DM operations (other currencies'  shares being insignifi-
cant) 
 
The third important indicator of the use of foreign currencies inside Russia concerns hou-
sehold savings. As we noted earlier, household savings in Russia are held largely in foreign 
currency cash and, in this case approximate quite well the ‘store of value’ role of euros and 
dollars in Russia.  
One can see from Figure 3 that the share of household's currency exchange opera-
tions in euros rose steadily starting in 2002 (when euro cash currency was introduced), 
peaked at 30 per cent in 2003, and was 20 per cent in 2004. These dynamics lead us to 
conclude that personal savings are being diversified: households have rapidly appraised the 
exchange rate risk (the rouble/dollar exchange rate decreased starting in January 2003 
while the rouble/euro exchange rate continued to increase) and payoff opportunities of in-
vesting in euros. This suggests that Russian households are behaving quite rationally and 
the problem of trust in the euro as a new currency does not seem to be very serious. In fact, 
the Russian population’s trust in euros is still stronger than its trust in the national banking 
system.  
The importance of the dollar could be related to policy issues. We should firstly 
remember the importance of dollar anchoring of the exchange rate policy: the exchange 
                                                                                                                                                    
1 See Figures 5-6 in Annex I for data about asset substitution in a large sense. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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rate corridor of 1995-1998 was exclusively dollar-based. The managed floating after Au-
gust 1998 devaluation was still dollar-based. Recently the Central Bank of Russia revised 
this policy: because of the importance of the European Union in external economic rela-
tions, the Central Bank of Russia's interventions have since February 2005 not been exclu-
sively based on the dollar rate but on a bi-currency basket (10 per cent euro and 90 per cent 
dollar initially; in May 2005 the share of the euro was increased to 30 per cent). The struc-
ture of the central bank’s currency reserve portfolio is another important signal to agents 
(primarily banks) about exchange rate policy: actually the euro's share in the foreign re-
serves of the Central Bank of Russia is increasing. Whereas before 2002 the share of cur-
rencies other than USD (including DM, £, Yen) never attained 10 per cent, the euro’s share 
in reserves reached 25 per cent in mid-2003 and 30-35 per cent in 2004. These dynamics 
are a positive indicator of the importance of Europe in foreign trade relations, but its effec-
tiveness can be estimated only in the future.  
Based on our empirical analysis, we would make two observations: in spite of rela-
tively good international trade relations with Europe, most of supporting the financial op-
erations are settled in dollars, and the exchange rate dynamics do not seem to have any im-
pact on this. As far as households' saving behaviour is concerned, we would view the di-
versification of their currency portfolios as a reaction to the exchange rate dynamics de-
spite the euro's brief history as a currency.  
 
3  Choice of substitution currency: Theories and estimation 
hypothesis 
Although an international role for the euro is not a direct objective of the ECB, discussion 
of the importance of this issue for Europe is still animated (Portes [1998], ECB [2002] 
[2005]). The available literature on the choice of substitute currencies is relatively rare 
(Heimonen [2001]). However, some of the research on dollarisation in the generic sense, 
could be applicable to our study. In this section we list some factors that may explain a 
country's choice of a foreign currency as a currency of substitution. 
The first explanation of the choice between currencies which we should test comes 
from international trade relations between countries, which should be followed by a trans-
action demand for foreign currency balances (Milner, Mizen and Pentecost [2000], de 
Vries [1988], Ratti and Jeong [1994]). The foreign currency demand within a country Anna Dorbec  
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should be related to transaction needs emerging from foreign trade. From the point of view 
of the choice of the substitution currency we should test the possible significant impact of 
trade with euro area countries on euro balances of economic agents in Russia, at least re-
gards the currency exchange operations of enterprises. Notice however that similar re-
search concerning Estonia (Heimonen [2001]) did not produce evidence of a significant 
impact of real factors on the aggregated indicator of choice between euro and dollar, 
largely because of extensive use of foreign currency in domestic transactions.   
Agents’ behaviour concerning the demand for foreign currencies is often examined 
by estimating the opportunity costs of holding domestic money. We can distinguish three 
main factors affecting the opportunity cost of holding foreign currency denominated 
money balances which could influence the choice of substitute currency. 
The first of these is the inflation rate. The depreciation of local currencies at the be-
ginning of transition, coupled with the liberalisation of foreign currency markets and the 
new possibility for households to hold foreign currencies, is the most often cited dollarisa-
tion factor (Calvo and Vegh [1996]). The theoretical interpretation of this fact addresses 
the existence of households' sunk costs due to holding their savings in local currency. This 
cost clearly depends on the effective (anticipated) inflation rate. The use of the dollar or 
euro as stable unit of account which anchors prices is justified especially in situations 
where the exact future inflation dynamics are difficult to forecast. When we apply this 
framework to the problem of choice between dollar and euro currency balances, we should 
also expect that differences in inflation rates between euro area and USA could affect 
agents' choices. In our estimation we include inflation by adjusting nominal exchange 
rates. 
The second variable affecting the opportunity cost of holding foreign currency bal-
ances is the interest rate. When we adjust for the inflation rate, we obtain the real interest 
rate. Thus, the opportunity cost of holding money can be separated into factors, i.e. the op-
portunity cost of holding money due to the interest rate and the opportunity cost of holding 
money due to relative inflation rates. Accordingly, ‘asset substitution’ should be affected 
by nominal or real interest rates. More generally, the use of foreign currencies as reserve 
assets depends on interest rates (nominal or real) in the case where households make for-
eign currency denominated deposits or buy other forex assets. We should however note 
that in the case of holding cash (dollars or euros) as a store of value (because of a lack of BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/ 2005 
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confidence in the banking system, independent of opportunity costs) interest rates should 
have less explicative power.  
The third variable impacting on the opportunity costs of holding currencies is the 
dynamics of nominal and real exchange rates (Heimonen [2001]). This affects either for-
eign currency cash holdings or foreign currency denominated assets (bank deposits and 
other securities). We test the possible impact of both nominal and real exchange rates on 
the structure of demand for the substitute currency.  
However, the approach in terms of opportunity costs does not seem to provide a 
sufficient explanation of the above-mentioned significant differences between dollar domi-
nation of the financial activity and the importance of trade with European countries. Op-
portunity costs of holding dollars should be much lower than costs of holding euros. How-
ever, differences in inflation or exchange rate volatility as between the euro area and USA 
do not seem to be extreme. Other possible factors are related to ‘irrational’ behaviour of 
economic agents.  
Inertia in currency substitution between domestic and foreign currency balances has 
been widely documented (Piontkovsky [2003]), yet there is a limited number of studies 
that specifically address the issue of detecting inertia among substitute foreign currencies. 
Possible inertia between euro and dollar balances has obvious importance for the dynamics 
of currency competition between the dollar and the euro. Based on existing studies, we can 
cite two potential determining factors: hysteresis and network externalities. 
Several studies associate inertial behaviour with hysteresis. Feige [2003] notes that 
observed hysteresis effects in dollarisation ratios in transition countries are closely related 
to the lack of confidence in domestic monetary assets resulting from past inflations, 
devaluations and bank confiscations. This behaviour appears to be difficult to reverse, even 
when macroeconomic conditions stabilise. Ahumada [1992], Guidotti and Rodriquez 
[1992], Piterman [1988] all find empirical evidence that dollarisation may remain high 
even when the opportunity cost of holding domestic money has decreased. Decreasing in-
flation and the relative stabilisation of exchange rates did not reduce the high level of dol-
larisation in countries touched by this phenomenon. Hysteresis is often modelled as a 
'ratchet effect'.  
A ratchet effect is said to occur when we observe an asymmetric reaction of the 
variable to changes in one or more factors, depending on whether the latter rises or falls 
(Mongardini and Mueller [1999]). This phenomenon is related to the long memory of im-Anna Dorbec  
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portant and violent changes in exogenous variable dynamics, which induces important un-
certainty aversion in agents’ behaviour (Epstein [1999]). In such situations agents’ decision 
are made in reference to the worst-case scenario, its decision weight being dependent on 
the degree of ‘probability imprecision’. The perception of it increases in situations of doubt 
about the relevance of previously used decision models (Routledge and Zin [2001]). In this 
case, the stabilisation does not induce a rapid return to the normal level. The adjustment is, 
therefore, asymmetric and achieved with many lags.  
The ratchet effect in dollarisation is often modelled by introducing an adjustment or 
'switching' cost associated with learning how to use new financial instruments (Guidotti 
and Rodriguez [1992], Sturzenegger [1992], Engineer [2000]), which naturally creates cer-
tain inflation or currency depreciation bands within which there is no incentive to de-
dollarize. In this case, a learning period is necessary for economic agents to understand the 
functioning of new financial instruments that can substitute for foreign currency (Dorn-
busch and Reynoso [1989]). 
Another interpretation is that inertia is related to the fact that there exist “expecta-
tions' adjustment periods before domestic agents become convinced that current macroeco-
nomic stability has permanence and inflationary policies will not be repeated” (Peiers and 
Wrase, [1997]).  
The ‘learning costs’ explanation for ratchet effects/hysteresis does not however 
seem to be relevant to our study, given the fact that the choice between euro and dollar 
does not require any special learning procedures. However, the existence of psychological 
adjustment periods has certainly played a role, especially in light of the fact that the euro is 
a new currency and some period is necessary to be sure that it will function at least as well 
as the deutschemark
2. Logically, this effect should be more visible in financial and reserve 
aspects of the demand for substitution currency than in enterprises’ transactions, which are 
realised instantaneously and do not require any special learning or long term expectations.  
Another important factor explaining the existence of persistence in dollarisation 
which is directly applicable to the euro/dollar case, is more closely related to the transac-
tions demand for money. Money as a means of exchange produces network externalities 
(Feige et al [2002], Shinkevich and Oomes [2002])  
                                                 
2 This argument is closely related to ‘confidence in money’ issues. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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“Network externalities occur when the benefits for a given agent of holding a certain cur-
rency increase with the use of this currency by other agents. In other words, when the use 
of dollars in a given trade network grows, this increases the value of holding dollars for 
each member of the network, irrespective of the depreciation rate or other rate of return 
considerations. If network externalities are strong enough, therefore, a high degree of dol-
larisation can persist after macroeconomic stabilization”. (Shinkevich, Oomes [2002] , 
p.6).  
The authors use original data from the New York Federal Reserve Bank on exports 
of dollar denominated banknotes and official Russian statistics to demonstrate the exis-
tence of network externalities in the overall dollarisation behaviour in Russia in 1992-
1998.  
Knowing that the dollar has been a dominant currency of substitution during the 
transition period
3, the use of the dollar as a means of exchange (also in internal transac-
tions) may produce a benefit comparing to the use of the euro because the probability of 
agent k finding a ‘dollarised’ partner is higher than for a ‘euroised’ one. In other words, it 
is costly to transact in foreign currency if others do not use it enough (Uribe [1997]). We 
should notice that this approach is similar to that concerning the origins of money, using 
evolutionary game theoretic models (De Larquier et al [2001]). Thus, above a certain level 
of dollarisation, while the dollar is widely used, assuming all monetary functions, changing 
to another currency of substitution, to the euro (or back to the domestic money) is costly. 
This explanation seems plausible as a factor in the persistence of the dollar as a means of 
exchange. If network externalities are strong enough, therefore, a high degree of dollarisa-
tion can persist, even in the absence of ratchet variables. 
We can easily understand that the transactional and reserve roles of foreign curren-
cies are not equally concerned with network externalities. We should expect a lesser influ-
ence for the reserve role of currencies than for their transactional role. When all bank ex-
change offices carry out both euro and dollar conversion operations (which is true in Rus-
sia) savers should worry only about the exchange rate dynamics and be less concerned 
about network externalities. However, this factor could be present in cases of illegal use of 
foreign currencies in transactions (which is frequent, particularly in real estate transac-
tions). 
The choice of exchange rate regime is another factor related to the choice of substi-
tute currency. As mentioned above, the important anchoring of Russian monetary policy to 
                                                 
3 Illicitly, the dollar was perceived as a truly hard currency even before 1992, but no data exactly quantifying 
this phenomenon are available. Anna Dorbec  
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the dollar (recently, in 1995-1998, the exchange rate corridor fixed the dollar exchange rate 
fluctuation bands, and the dollar was the main intervention currency of the Central Bank of 
Russia during the whole estimation period and was used as the unit of account for all offi-
cial international statistics) contributes to wider private use of dollars and generates net-
work externalities. The signalling interpretation of this phenomenon is also possible. In this 




4  Econometric analysis 
 
As follows from our descriptive analysis, but also from our theoretical hypothesis, we 
should expect possible differences in the behaviour of different types of economic agents 
(enterprises, banks, households) concerning the choice between currencies of substitution. 
In this study different aspects of the demand for substitution currencies are analysed sepa-
rately. Using the available data we calculated proxies to estimate households’ cash opera-
tions (reflecting their savings behaviour) and total transactions (non cash) realised in the 
Russian currency exchange market, which can be considered a proxy for the currency 
structure of the (mainly transactional) demand of enterprises/banks.  
We use monthly series for the period from January 1999 to November 2004. All 
operations related to euro cash in the period 1999-2001 are approximated by operations in 
Deutschemarks, as the only significant European currency on the Russian forex market 
during this period.  
Three alternative indicators of household demand for foreign currencies cash 
(source: Central Bank of Russia) and one indicator of the demand of enterprises are used in 
the estimations
5.  
(I)   Share of the euro in total cash conversion operations of banks’ currency exchange of-
fices inside Russia (DECASH = euros exchanged/(all currencies exchanged during the pe-
riod)). 
                                                 
4 This parameter cannot be included in this study because it is situated outside of our data set.  
5 A more detailed description of variables is presented in the Annex II. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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(II)  Transactions realised in euros as a percentage of the total number of transactions of 
exchange offices of banks inside Russia (ETRANSACT = number of euro-rouble transac-
tions/total number of conversion transactions). 
(III)  Share of the euro in total imports of foreign currency bills into Russia (IM-
PORT_EUROBILLS = bills in euro imported/total foreign currency bills imported). As 
this importing is realised by banks, the estimated equations differ slightly. 
(IV)  As a proxy for the demand for currencies by enterprises and banks including the 
transactional and partly financial component of the demand for currencies of substitution, 
we use the share of the euro in total turnover of Russian currency exchanges (EURO-
GROS). This proxy excludes illegal cash transactions, which are impossible to estimate on 
the basis of official statistics (and require more informal approaches such as queries).  
As no statistical series on the structure of assets by currency for bank credits and 
deposits are publicly available (however, some data are presented in Section 2), estimation 
of the ‘financial’ role of the euro and dollar is impossible. Because discussions on the dol-
lar and euro in CBR monetary policy has been quite animated, we are hopeful that this data 
will be available in the future.  
In light of our descriptive analysis and theories discussed, we estimate econometri-
cally the impacts of three main factors on the choice of economic agents between the euro 
and the dollar. 
[A]  Lagged endogenous: captures the possible inertia in currency demand behaviour. As 
mentioned above, in the case of network externalities the importance of this factor 
should be more pronounced for the EUROGROS variable (which is more closely re-
lated to the transactional demand) than for savings demand estimations (I-III indica-
tors). In the case of important hysteresis related to the choice of the currency of sub-
stitution, asset substitution is more concerned and we should account for a more im-
portant impact of the lagged variable in regressions using indicators I-III.  
[B]  Exchange rate: for testing the impact of dollar/euro and rouble/euro exchange rates
6 
expressed in nominal and in real terms (to account for possible inflation differential 
influence). 
[C]  Real trade: we test three alternative indicators.  Anna Dorbec  
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i)  Share of enlarged Europe in total trade of Russia excluding oil 
(eu25_nonoil).  
ii)  Share of trade between Russia and enlarged Europe in total external trade of 
Russia (eu25_total). 
iii) Share of trade between Russia and enlarged Europe in external trade of 
Russia excluding CIS trade (eu25_noncis).  
[D]  Regressions I and II include an additional variable which could influence the choice 
between currencies: the relative average margin applied by banks on conversion op-
erations (Euromarge=margin on euro operations/margin on dollars operations). We 
do not include this variable for IMPORT_EUROBILLS estimation because of its 
weak exogeneity; as the margin is decided by banks, it is necessarily dependent on 
their stocks of banknotes. 
[E]  We also use dummies to capture the possible impacts of the introduction of euro cash 
in 2002 (DUMMY_EUROCASH) and for the recent banking crisis (summer 2004) 
(DUMMY_CRISE). 
                                                                                                                                                    
6 An increase in the exchange rate means euro appreciation (versus dollar or ruble) Estimated models: DECASH (I)  
1.  DECASH=const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_nonoil+α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
2.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_total+α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
3.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_noncis+α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
4.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_nonoil+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
5.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_total+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
6.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_noncis+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
7.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_nonoil+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
8.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_total+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
9.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_noncis+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
10.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_nonoil+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
11.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_total+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
12.  DECASH =const+α1 DECASH(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_noncis+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
All equations are estimated in first differences using GMM. Significant coefficients (P(t)<10%) are presented in bold 
DECASH Variable  Specifications 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
Const Const  0.015 0.015 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000  -2.347 -2.394 -2.389  0.034 0.042 0.041 
  P(t)  0.047 0.051 0.055 0.998 0.996 0.995 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.740 0.698 0.724 
[A]  Inertial  DECASH(-6)  0.544  0.533  0.533  0.425  0.410 0.410 0.531 0.504 0.503 0.414 0.397 0.401 
  P(t)  0.008 0.009 0.010 0.063 0.079 0.079 0.016 0.028 0.028 0.068 0.087 0.082 
[B]    Exchange  rate  doll_euro  1.911  1.923  1.921           
  P(t)  0.000  0.000  0.000           
  rub_euro     -0.002  -0.002  -0.002        
  P(t)      0.665  0.616  0.625        
  doll_euro_real        2.365  2.411  2.406     
  P(t)         0.000  0.000  0.000     
  rub_euro_real            -0.034  -0.043  -0.041 
  P(t)            0.738  0.696  0.723 
[C]  Real trade  eu25_nonoil  0.039      -0.003      0.134      -0.005     
  P(t)  0.703     0.967     0.318     0.946    
  eu25_total   0.042     0.005     0.132     0.002   
  P(t)   0.669     0.936     0.317     0.969   
  eu25_noncis     0.031     0.004     0.103     0.001 
  P(t)     0.698     0.938     0.334     0.987 
[D]  Conversion margin  euromarge  0.127 0.127 0.128  -0.018 -0.019 -0.019  0.162 0.162 0.162  -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 
  P(t)  0.047 0.049 0.048 0.619 0.609 0.605 0.044 0.046 0.045 0.597 0.573 0.578 
  J-statistic  0.080 0.080 0.080 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.049 0.049 0.051 0.100 0.100 0.100 
  P  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  DW  1.83 1.84 1.85 1.44 1.43 1.43 1.86 1.89 1.90 1.44 1.43 1.43 
 
 Estimated models: ETRANSACT (II) 
1.  ETRANSACT=const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_nonoil+α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
2.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_total+α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
3.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_noncis+α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
4.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_nonoil+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
5.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_total+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
6.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_noncis+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
7.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_nonoil+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
8.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_total+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
9.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_noncis+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
10.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_nonoil+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
11.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_total+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
12.  ETRANSACT =const+α1 ETRANSACT(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_noncis+ α4euromarge+α5dummy_crise+α6dummy_eurocash+εt 
All equations are estimated in first differences using GMM. Significant coefficients (P(t)<10%) are presented in bold 
ETRANSACT Variable  Specifications 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12 
Const Const  0.015 0.016 0.015 0.000  0.000 0.000  -1.949 -1.941 -1.937 -0.107 -0.103 -0.102 
  P(t)  0.027 0.020 0.024 0.878  0.985 0.989 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.386 0.393 0.417 
[A]  Inertial  ETRANSACT (-6)  0.823  0.783  0.782  0.842  0.930 0.931 1.267 1.253 1.233 0.931 0.927 0.928 
  P(t)  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.036 0.043 0.045 0.001 0.001 0.001 
[B]  Exchange rate  doll_euro  1.479  1.508  1.501            
  P(t)  0.000 0.000 0.000            
  rub_euro      0.003  0.004  0.004        
  P(t)      0.614  0.371  0.396        
  doll_euro_real          1.960  1.953  1.949     
  P(t)          0.000  0.000  0.000     
  rub_euro_real             0.107  0.103  0.102 
  P(t)             0.385  0.392  0.415 
[C]  Real trade  eu25_nonoil  0.031      0.008    -0.130     0.004    
 P(t)  0.747      0.850     0.573     0.968    
 eu25_total    0.042      0.014     -0.090     0.011  
 P(t)    0.651      0.841     0.563     0.885  
 eu25_noncis      0.032     0.010      -0.067     0.007 
 P(t)      0.669     0.869     0.578     0.914 
[D]  Conversion margin  euromarge  0.115 0.111 0.114 0.012  0.021 0.020 0.104 0.117 0.118 0.022 0.024 0.023 
  P(t)  0.035 0.040 0.036 0.689  0.454 0.456 0.151 0.080 0.079 0.446 0.392 0.396 
  J-statistic  0.095 0.098 0.097 0.114  0.104 0.103 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.102 0.102 0.102 
  P  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  DW  1.70 1.72 1.73 1.56 1.64 1.63 1.78 1.73 1.73 1.59 1.60 1.60 Estimated models: IMPORT_EUROBILLS (III) 
1.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6) +α2doll_euro+α3eu25_nonoil+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
2.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_total+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
3.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_noncis+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
4.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_nonoil+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
5.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_total+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
6.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_noncis+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
7.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_nonoil+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
8.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_total+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
9.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_noncis+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
10.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_nonoil+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
11.  IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_total+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
12. IMPORT_EUROBILLS =const+α1 IMPORT_EUROBILLS(-6)+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_noncis+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
All equations are estimated in first differences using GMM. Significant coefficients (P(t)<10%) are presented in bold 
IMPORT_EUROBILLS Variable  Specifications 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12 
Const  Const  0.041 0.042 0.044  -0.024  -0.025  -0.027  -7.395 -7.329 -7.233 -6.867 -6.721 -6.504 
  P(t)  0.242 0.220 0.201 0.577 0.559 0.535 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[A]  Inertial  Import_eurobills(-6)  1.317  1.306  1.299 0.847 0.860 0.846 1.043 1.113 1.072 0.816 0.841 0.833 
  P(t)  0.015 0.019 0.016 0.095 0.094 0.099 0.042 0.046 0.045 0.074 0.073 0.080 
[B]  Exchange rate  doll_euro  7.739 7.687 7.633           
  P(t)  0.000  0.000  0.000           
  rub_euro      0.294 0.293 0.290        
  P(t)      0.002  0.002  0.004        
  doll_euro_real         7.434 7.373 7.279     
  P(t)         0.000  0.000  0.000     
  rub_euro_real            6.863 6.718 6.503 
  P(t)            0.000  0.000  0.000 
[C]    Real  trade  eu25_nonoil  -0.481     0.525    -1.185    -0.874    
  P(t)  0.493     0.544     0.150     0.313    
  eu25_total    -0.285     0.394     -0.748     -0.998  
  P(t)    0.571     0.677     0.172     0.241  
  eu25_noncis    -0.233     0.206    -0.575    -0.955 
  P(t)     0.534     0.783     0.149     0.142 
  J-statistic  0.079 0.085 0.086 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.044 0.054 0.056 0.062 0.062 0.058 
  P  1.000 1.000 1.000 0.987 0.987 0.986 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.969 0.969 0.971 
  DW  1.74 1.71 1.71 1.76 1.78 1.77 1.82 1.69 1.70 1.71 1.62 1.60 
 Estimated models: EUROGROS (IV) 
1.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_nonoil+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
2.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_total+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
3.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2doll_euro+α3eu25_noncis+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
4.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_nonoil+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
5.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_total+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
6.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2rub_euro+α3eu25_noncis+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
7.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_nonoil+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
8.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_total+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
9.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2doll_euro_real+α3eu25_noncis+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
10.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_nonoil+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
11.  EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_total+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
12. EUROGROS=const+α1EUROGROS6+α2rub_euro_real+α3eu25_noncis+α4dummy_crise+α5dummy_eurocash+εt 
All equations are estimated in first differences using GMM. Significant coefficients (P(t)<10%) are presented in bold 
EUROGROS Variable  Specifications 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12 
Const  Const  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.004 0.002 0.001  -0.001 0.000 
  P(t)  0.077 0.105 0.095 0.033 0.133 0.118 0.560 0.869 0.927 0.973 0.975 0.995 
[A]  Inertial  EUROGROS6  1.706  1.598  1.552  1.646 1.554 1.512 1.732 1.607 1.557 1.588 1.467 1.441 
  P(t)  0.044 0.048 0.055 0.026 0.050 0.055 0.043 0.049 0.055 0.064 0.068 0.075 
[B]    Exchange  rate  doll_euro  -0.015  -0.006  -0.004           
  P(t)  0.493  0.788  0.853           
  rub_euro     -0.001  0.000  0.000        
  P(t)      0.068  0.820  0.837        
  doll_euro_real       -0.013  -0.003  -0.001     
  P(t)         0.592  0.902  0.960     
  rub_euro_real            0.000  0.001  0.001 
  P(t)            0.990  0.940  0.957 
[C]  Real trade  eu25_nonoil  0.014      0.014      0.014     0.015    
  P(t)  0.089     0.084     0.108     0.135    
  eu25_total    0.014     0.013     0.014     0.014  
  P(t)    0.058     0.078     0.064     0.080  
  eu25_noncis     0.011     0.011     0.011     0.011 
  P(t)     0.054     0.067     0.059     0.071 
  J-statistic  0.094 0.089 0.089 0.108 0.092 0.092 0.095 0.090 0.090 0.098 0.090 0.090 
  P  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  DW  2.03 2.08 2.09 2.03 2.08 2.08 2.02 2.08 2.09 2.05 2.11 2.12 
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Estimation results 
[A]  Lagged endogenous. We tested several lags. The best results are obtained with 6-month 
lags for all four examined indicators. We can interpret this result as the average reaction 
time necessary to account for a possible switch in agents’ behaviour. Note that the impact 
of the lagged variable is more important for the transactional demand proxy (related coef-
ficient for EUROGROS is positive, statistically significant and between 1.441 and 1.732 
), than for its use for savings purposes (their values are between 0.397 and 0.544 for 
DECAH, between 0.782 and 1.267  for ETRANSACT, between 0.816 and 1.317 for IM-
PORT_EUROBILLS). This result suggests that network externalities do in fact concern 
the transactional demand for substitution currency. The possible hysteresis influence on 
households' savings behaviour related to the existence of a psychological adjustment pe-
riod, though existing, is less important. As no violent changes in euro/dollar rates were 
observed during the period of our study, this result is not surprising. 
[B]  Exchange rate.  
•  No influence on transactional demand (independently of indicator used). This fact con-
firms our hypothesis about the importance of network externalities. The choice of trans-
actions currency is unrelated to current nominal or real exchange rate dynamics, but 
probably is related to routine behaviour. 
•  Dollar/euro exchange rate is a better explicative variable for  the choice of a substitution 
currency as a store of value. We see that the behaviour of Russian households is quite ra-
tional. This result suggests appreciation of the euro on international markets would have 
a positive impact for its role in the Russian economy and thus would increase the euro’s 
international role. The significance of both rouble and dollar to euro exchange rates ap-
pears only for IMPORT_EUROBILLS estimation, which presumes the importance of 
both indicators in banking decisions. 
•  Differences between the impacts of exchange rates in nominal and real terms do not seem 
to be very important: both indicators are positive and significant (euro appreciation ver-
sus dollar is followed by an increase in its share in Russian household savings flows). We 
should suppose that inflation differentials have limited direct influence on the choice of 
substitution currencies, whereas the impact of nominal exchange rates is more important.  Anna Dorbec  
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[C]  Real trade 
•  Independent of the indicator used, the real factor has no influence on household demand 
for currency: their choice is based only on their previous practices and financial vari-
ables. 
•  Real trade influence on the transactional component, though positive and significant, is 
relatively weak. In this case we cannot expect the ‘natural’ equilibration of the market 
following real needs: routines are well anchored, and a particular policy is necessary to 
equilibrate it and to induce exporters and importers to use euros when trading with 
Europe. 
[D]  The impact of the Euromarge variable on household demand for euros and dollars is in-
conclusive: counter-intuitively, it appears to be positive for some specifications while it 
is insignificant for others. Apparently, banks increase relative exchange margins in re-
sponse to the growing demand for euros, but this does not discourage households from 
buying euros. On the contrary, we cannot exclude the existence of a temporary shortage 
of euros for some periods which created some minor panics in this market, implying such 
non-market behaviour by households.  
Finally our estimation confirms the importance of the disaggregated approach: enterprises’ and 
households’ demands for substitution currencies do not depend on the same variables. While 
the inertial component seems to be significant for all specifications, which supposes the exis-
tence of routines, of network externalities and the necessity of some ‘adaptation’ period, the 
exchange rate dynamics are important only for households’ choice of reserve currency. The 
transactional demand of enterprises is driven mainly by routines and network externalities and 
weakly by real trade. 
 
5  Inertia: Hysteresis, network externalities, routines and  
conventions  
 
As we have demonstrated econometrically, both the transactional and reserve roles of substitu-
tion currencies have an important inertial component. The choice of currency of substitution is 
dependent not only on exogenous variables (such as exchange rates or trade volumes) but also BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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on past experience and on the behaviour of others. The existence of network externalities as-
sumes the necessity of including some aspects of interaction between agents. Another aspect 
explaining the weakness of the euro as a substitution currency is related to routines and the ad-
aptation period necessary to build confidence. These aspects require more detailed understand-
ing, particularly because of their impact on the reaction of concerned economic agents to de-
dollarisation policies.  
Such dynamics are representative of 'conventional' behaviour: repeatedly used solutions 
when coordination between agents is necessary. The problem of coordination is central where 
money is concerned: the coordination of economic agents by using one currency for their trade 
appears to improve the situation of every agent (Aglietta and Orléan [2002]). According to the 
theoretical approach of conventions, an example of good coordination (in our case, the large 
use of the dollar as a substitution currency) leads to the recurrence of a behaviour pattern on a 
routine basis; once started, the knowledge of the reason why this choice was made is unneces-
sary and could disappear rapidly; what is important is that the adopted convention is a solution 
that helps maintain relatively successful coordination. By referring to the theoretical features of 
convention described by Batifoulier and De Larquier [2001] and Orléan [1994], we readily ob-
serve that the dominant position of the US dollar as a main substitution currency in Russia de-




Why applicable to dollar dominance case 
Arbitrarity/conventionality: 
other coordination is possible 
Use of other currencies as unit of account, means of ex-
change and store of value is possible in Russia  
No explicit sanctions for non-use 
of dollar could be mentioned 
while implicit losses could exist 
The dollar is as authorised as euro: no official limitations 
on euro circulation (compared to dollar) 
No official definition  Rouble is the official currency in Russia. Officially no 
currency is defined as the international transaction cur-
rency: free market approach is used. 
Repeatedly/automatically  used   Once the dollar is installed as the main substitution cur-
rency, its use is repeated quite automatically  
Conventional choices are not necessarily optimal: suboptimal choices can be used continually. 
Simulations, according to the evolutionary games approach (De Larquier and Gannon [2001]) 
formally demonstrate the slow and gradual modification of conventional behaviour inside a 
society. Evolutionary game theory identifies several factors of a convention’s inertia.  
Conformity preference. One can suppose the existence of an additional payoff from adopting 
the widespread convention. As in the network externalities approach, the overall use of one Anna Dorbec  
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currency (rouble, dollar, or euro) reduces potential transaction costs for each economic agent. 
In principle, it is relatively less important whether a decision is optimal or not—successful co-
ordination’s potential payoffs are greater. As we mentioned above, the degree of implication of 
the operation in social coordination (assuming interactions between agents) is highly important 
in defining the impact of this factor on the choice of agents.  
Path dependency. When a convention appears as an equilibrium of an evolutionary 
game played in deterministic strategies, replication learning (the procedure close to the ‘learn-
ing by doing’) implies ‘path dependency’ of the equilibrium (clearly depending of the initial 
state). In such conditions the modification of a convention cannot be automatic: it requires an 
initial shock. Such a shock could be introduced as an exogenous modification of a gains ma-
trix, but also by the introduction of a ‘mutation’ (some fraction of agents adopts non-
conventional strategy). Applied to the problematic of choice of substitution currency, such a 
shock could be produced by an important change in exchange rates but also by legal measures, 
suggesting use of the euro in some foreign currency denominated operations. 
Some conventional choices are stable because of their versatility. A convention is ver-
satile if, by following it, one can hope to accommodate oneself, at no additional cost, to an-
other player who is following a different convention. Such a convention is most readily adapt-
able to possible unforeseen changes in other players’ strategies. The ‘dollar convention’ in 
Russia seems to be very versatile on account of the widespread use of the dollar around the 
world, as well as its high internal liquidity: this fact helps in understanding the use of a dollar 
as a vehicle currency, as observed in Russian national currency markets. 
Risk dominance.  A risk dominant strategy is the best choice in the case of the worst 
outcome of a non-cooperative game, i.e. in the case of the least favourable behaviour of others 
(Harsanyi and Selten [1988]). This factor is closely related to expectations and so to the store-
of-value role of foreign currencies. Young [1993], Kandori, Maiath and Rob [1993] have dem-
onstrated that in a game with two possible Nash equilibria – one of which is Pareto optimal and 
the other risk dominant –  all players will gradually come to choose the second.  
The risk dominance approach is related to hysteresis: agents continue to choose strate-
gies which have given them the best results in the ‘worst cases’ encountered in the past. In the 
past, the dollar was a good solution for the majority of economic agents (while the euro did not 
exist) during banking and currency crises (1994, 1995, and 1998). From this perspective, the 
preference for the dollar (particularly as a saving instrument) could represent a risk dominant 
strategy for risk/uncertainty-adverse agents. It is important to notice that past experience mat-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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ters as an instrument for defining the ‘worst scenario’. In this sense, the banking crisis of sum-
mer 2004 probably afforded a good opportunity to test the robustness of the euro, thus reducing 
the importance of the hysteresis factor for the choice of the dollar as a substitution currency in 
Russia. 
In the situations where individuals do not have a priori complete information about past 
and future strategies, conventional practices play a normative role. When it is impossible to 
obtain complete information about the future strategy of each agent in a society,
7 repeated 
practices (conventions) become examples to follow. By analysing the demand for foreign cur-
rency of Russian households, we can suppose that the overall use of the dollar induces unin-
formed agents to use it and thus reinforces dollar dominance ('auto-referential' behaviour as in 
Orléan [1999]).  
The approach in terms of the theory of conventions helps us to understand the nature of 
the choice of currency of substitution and dominance of dollar in this role in Russia. As we 
demonstrated in our econometric study, this choice is not exclusively related to exogenous 
variable dynamics (such as trade relations and exchange rate variations) but is also related to an 
important inertial component. The conventions approach suggests the importance of including 
other factors in the analysis of such inertia, especially past experience, degree of implication of 
each particular form of currency holdings in a collective interactions game, and degree of 
risk/uncertainty-aversion of the involved economic agents. This approach seems to be relevant 
not only for the specific analysis of choice between euro and dollar but also for the analysis of 
the dollarisation phenomenon in general.  
                                                 
7 Because of the limited rationality of agents (Simon [1982] ) but also because of the uncertainty (Keynes [1937]) 
which characterises the Russian transition period (Khartchenko-Dorbec, [2004] ) Anna Dorbec  
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6  Concluding remarks 
Our analysis of features of choice between substitution currencies in Russia leads to the follo-
wing conclusions.  
(1) The gap between the geographical structure of real trade and choice of substitution cur-
rency in Russia is significant: while the European area dominates in the real sphere, the US 
dollar is still the main currency used in financial activities. 
(2) Households and enterprises do not behave in the same manner: while the exchange rate dy-
namics are highly important for households’ decisions, its influence on banks/enterprises 
decisions is quite insignificant. The observed euro appreciation, while favourable for the 
diversification of currency portfolios of households, does not change the choice of enter-
prises
8.  On the other hand, the increasing volume of real trade between Europe and Russia 
seems not to be sufficient to reduce dollar dominance.  
(3) The importance of the inertial component in the choice of substitution currency is con-
firmed for the Russian case. The interpretation of this result from the point of view of con-
ventions theory (which provides a general framework including network externalities and 
the hysteresis approach) supports the necessity of a disaggregated approach to dollarisation 
issues. The implication of each operation in a collective game, the degree of risk-aversion 
and past experience all seem to need to be taken into account. This fact implies weak short 
term efficiency of economic policies in this field: a long/medium term approach is neces-
sary.  
In the future, this scheme could be applied to dollarisation as a whole in Russia first and then to 
other countries concerned with dollarisation problem.  
                                                 
8 Accordingly, the appreciation of the rouble could be favourable to the conversion of households’ savings in na-
tional currency. However, rouble appreciation, while it seems to be positive for its reserve role, has negative con-
sequences in terms of national industry’s competitiveness, so the overall impact of this policy should be estimated 
with accuracy.  This estimation is an interesting research project but beyond the objectives of this paper. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Annex I Generic dollarisation in Russia  












































































































External trade/GDP Exports/GDP Imports/GDP Trade Balance/GDP
 
Source: Bank of Russia, Russian Federal Statistical Service 















































































































































Forex deposits/Total deposits Foreign currency deposits/Broad money, %
Foreign currency deposits Broad money
 
Source: Bank of Russia 
In Figure 5 we can see that starting from 2001 the share of foreign currency denominated assets 
is declining (while Figure 4 shows an increase in the foreign trade/GDP ratio), which clearly 
establishes the important financial component in dollarisation phenomenon observed in Russia.  Anna Dorbec  
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Foreign currencies net acquisitions of households (as % of total savings)
6 per. Mov. Avg. (Foreign currencies net acquisitions of households (as % of total savings))
 
Source: Bank of Russia 
The importance of the financial component in the dollarisation phenomena should take into 
account the important use of foreign currencies as an instrument of savings. We can clearly see 
from Figure 6 that this form of savings plays a highly important role (and still proves to be the 
first means of savings for households). We can observe two important picks of dollar acquisi-
tions related to the periods of high instability in the banking sector. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Annex II Variables 
Name Status  Construction  Source 
DECASH  endogenous  Euros exchanged by households in banks' exchange offices 
during the month [recalculated in dollars using average ex-
change rate]/all currencies exchanged in banks' exchange of-
fices during the month [recalculated in dollars using average 
exchange rate] 
Central Bank of 
Russia (CBR) 
ETRANSACT  endogenous  Number of euro-to-rouble conversion operations in banks' ex-
change offices during the period/total number of cash exchange 
operations of banks' exchange offices during the month 
CBR 
IMPORT_EUROBILLS  endogenous  Banknotes in euro imported by all Russian banks during the 
month [recalculated in dollars using average exchange 
rate]/total amount of foreign bills imported by all Russian 
banks during the month [recalculated in dollars using average 
exchange rate] 
CBR 
EUROGROS  endogenous   Total amount of euros exchanged on all official Russian cur-
rency exchanges [non cash exchange operations, recalculated in 
dollars using average exchange rate]/total amount of currencies 
traded on Russian currency exchanges during the month [recal-
culated in dollars using average exchange rate] 
CBR 
rub_euro  exogenous  Nominal euro to ruble exchange rate (for 1 euro)  CBR 
doll_euro  exogenous  Nominal euro to dollar exchange rate (for 1 euro)  CBR 
Rub_euro_real exogenous   
Real ruble to dollar exchange rate 
  
Doll_euro_real exogenous   
Real euro to dollar exchange rate  
  
eu25_nonoil  exogenous  exports of all goods less oil + imports of Russia to 25 European 
countries /total exports+imports of Russia 
CBR and Euro-
stat 
eu25_total  exogenous  exports + imports of Russia to 25 European countries /total 
exports + imports of Russia 
CBR and Euro-
stat 
eu25_noncis  exogenous  exports + imports of Russia to 25 European countries/total ex-
ports+imports of Russia outside CIS 
CBR and Euro-
stat 
euromarge  exogenous  average spread on operations with euro in banks' exchange 
offices inside Russia /average spread on operations with dollars 
in banks' exchange offices inside Russia 
CBR 
DUMMY_EUROCASH  dummy  1 for all periods after Jan 2002    
DUMMY_CRISE  dummy  1 for the periods from June 2004 (beginning of bank crisis) to 
October 2004 (end of crisis) 
  
ipc_ru  instrumental  Consumer price index in Russia  CBR 
ipc_euro  instrumental  Consumer price index in euro area  ECB 
ipc_US  instrumental  Consumer price index in US  Fed 
id_rub  instrumental  Average deposit rate in Russian banks  CBR 
ic_rub  instrumental  Average credit rate in Russian banks  CBR 
id_euro  instrumental  Deposit facility ECB rate  ECB 
irefi_euro instrumental  Main  refinancing operations ECB interest rate  ECB 
ifed_doll  instrumental  US Federal Reserve discount rate  FED 
rub_doll  instrumental  Nominal dollar to ruble exchange rate (for 1 dollar)  CBR 
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